For the purpose of this study, the case selection task undertaken here selected the most similar cases in research designs, which means the cases differ in only one dependent or independent variables. It includes cases with the variation in the outcome both success and failure of the Chinese leadership's project. The analytical objective is a useful way to account for Southeast Asian states' varied positions toward China's cooperative initiatives. The case selection stresses a methodological concern: in order to demonstrate most convincingly the effects of explanatory variables, process-tracing cross-case comparison is used.
By this method, it can be tested better whether "factors left out of the typological framework and that differed between the cases were causally related to the variation in the outcome" George and Bennett , The differences in term of leadership outcomes enable research to figure out factors affecting the aforementioned results. This paper is structured as follows: in the first section, the existing approaches to the study of "leadership" in International Relations IR is reviewed. In the next section, the framework which views leadership as a process with many steps is examined.
Within that, a "would-be-leader" uses his different abilities to mobilize the support of a "would-be-follower".
In the empirical investigation, I am going to focus on China's abilities to lead in Southeast Asia based on two case studies. Practices within the relationships between China and Southeast Asian states have shown that, despite the fact that there are many advantages for China; the mechanism of transforming power resources into regional leadership is still questionable.
What is international "leadership"? Leadership, as Young observes, is: "a complex phenomenon, ill-defined, poorly understood, and subject to recurrent controversy among students of international affair" Young , An international leader is usually considered a powerful actor who tries to control and guide another who requires power and willingness to utilize the power. This presumption, however, is vague and not quite appropriate to apply to analyze the research focus, which is the transformation from power resources to international leadership.
Other studies show more insights of this field, proving a diverse mosaic from different approaches Schirm For instance, the relationship between power and leadership is a question of whether the prominent power always leads to leadership.
If so, what are the methods or material capabilities used to gain the leading position? Another concern is placed on legitimacy of the leadership willingness, i. If not, what leads to failure? The following parts do not attempt to tackle all the above questions, but rather review research, ideas and approaches based on the theoretical literature of IR theory.
These play a vital role, since some ideas and interpretations of this research will be applied to build up a framework for this study. Accordingly, leadership will be approached by three interactive models which are the hierarchical, functional, and behavioral models.
Model 1: The first model places the perception of "international leadership" in a complex system of powers in the international system. This school understands the world as an anarchy in which no global government exists to hold the role of enforcement mechanism, hence the lack of authority to manage countries to follow a certain way. Natural resources, capital, technology, military forces, economic scale and population are key elements to creating the power of a state.
As such, power is regarded as the possession of those material resources, which is also called resources-based power approaches Fels The distribution of power in international politics contributes to the features of the international system. There are three types of systems: i Unipolarity - this system consists of only one strong power, all other countries are weaker and less competitive than the hegemon; ii Bipolarity - in this system, two powers own equivalent power like in the Cold War ; and iii Multipolarity - several powers exist at the same time in the same system Waltz The leader, in this context, is the country having enough power to be a unipole the first type.
Unipolarity is defined by distribution of material capabilities. Some other authors have modified this argument by taking "ability" into account in order to compliment calculations of the distribution of capabilities. Huntington's new definition of unipolarity emphasized that this is a system with "one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers". The leading country, according to this argument, would be able to "effectively resolve important international issues alone, and no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so" Huntington Model 2: The functional model links leadership status with a variety of specific functions in international affairs.
Under this perspective, leadership in international relations means "pushing for action" or shouldering responsibility in solving international affairs as a saying of Lao Tzu, cited by the Russian Foreign Minister in his recent article "Be the chief, but never the lord" Ivanov Those positions depend on the country's contribution in a certain situation.
As such, the country as a leader may play the role of an agenda-setter using its capability of figuring out initiatives to overcome ta common difficulty of the international community. Otherwise, a leader can be a mediator sorting out conflicts or disagreements between members of the group.
This can help to reduce escalating conflicts and set up regulations or agendas for involving parties in which a state can implement its leadership.
Being seen as a "good international citizen" is not enough; a leader should possess a distinctive international citizenship, providing proposals which attract others to solve the shared problems. The functional model is highlighted by many researchers as essential for a benevolent leader in order to ensure the order and common prosperity of the whole system, especially in the international economic order, according to the viewpoint of Hegemonic Stability Theory see Kindleberger ; Eichengreen Hard versions of this theory suggest that the absence of an identifiable leader in decisive moments will lead to anarchy and collapse.
The global power shift between England and the US in the early twentieth century can be a significant example. When a party was losing its leadership, and the other was not ready for taking the leading position yet, the great depression occurred in Modified versions of this theory come closer to the opinion which assumes that all multilateral cooperative decisions require a leader. Particularly, it says "hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes" Keohane , The role of a leader is considered to be crucial as it solves the issue of "public goods".
The goods, on the one hand, are necessary for fostering cooperation, but they are expensive and few single states can afford to pay or accept to pay alone. On the other hand, because of the "public" nature, the goods are not private possession, but serve for the common interests of the community. In order to have a successful cooperation, the leader should be able not only to mobilize parties to get involve, but also to bear full expenses of those goods. These cases share a common point of respecting the role of a single country as a leader, not highlighting its power. This demonstrates that even if a country holds prominent power, but refuses to lead or play a leading role of a group, it could not be seen as a leader.
Depending on the functions, every actor has different opportunities or obligations. Model 3: Leadership is not an attribute of a particular country, but a sort of relationship, in which the position of each country is determined by the order recognized by the other countries Clark , Leadership can only exist once there is followership.
In other words, if no countries follow or participate in the proposal suggested by a particular country, it cannot be recognized as a leader. In this context, there should be a distinction between hegemony and leadership, which depends on the objectives of the prominent state. While the hegemon aims "to realize its own egoistic goals by presenting them as common with those of subordinate states, the leader guides - 'leads' - a group of states in order to realize or facilitate the realization of their common objectives" Destradi , As Clark , 19 pointed out: "Leadership, in this perspective, is not just something that the hegemon 'does' or 'has', but something that international society 'sees'".
There are different kinds of relations between a leader and its followers: collective like within a group such as a regional bloc or individual like a hub and spokes Malamud , 3. In this relationship, to be an accepted regional and international leader, a state should pursue a smart and appropriate strategy in order to fulfill the needs of its potential followers, which usually are a combination between either material or economic or persuasive or ideological-normative Poggi Joseph Nye's three basic ways for leaders to "affect the behavior of others to get the outcomes you want" are: i coercion with threats; ii inducing with payments or iii attracting and co-opting with cultures, political values and policies Nye ; Pedersen presents the concept of cooperative hegemony as a grand strategy of regional powers, which consists of the three preconditions affecting the regional power's ability of opting for the strategy of cooperative hegemony.
Within this literature, we can identify some major points when doing research on the concept of leadership, especially when applied to the cases of emerging powers. First, leadership in international relations may contain many dimensions. It can be an individual, an action, a function or a relationship between countries.
Thus, once a country is mentioned as rising and becoming a leader, it should be specified the meaning of which the term leadership is understood. Second, power is a compulsory factor composing leadership in international relations. Owning power does not ensure that the power could be effectively transformed to political influences, which partly create the leading position. This should be noticed when studying rising powers because i it points out that a country may become stronger, but fail to become a leader at a region or in the world ; and ii a country can be the leader in a certain region, but not in other regions, which is described under the name of "issues-based leadership" or "problem-based leadership".
Third, examining the rise of emerging powers requires an analytical framework in order to study the object through a process rather than focusing on a single point, which is emphasized by earlier research except for some recent research of Narbes or analysis framework proposed by Nye The author believes that this approach will help to enrich the understanding about power, the way of utilizing power and methods that other countries deal with the power of emerging powers in their interaction.
In this context, I argue that we need use analytical lenses eclectically by combining all factors related to power and the using of power to gain leadership status. In order to make sense of the leadership performances adopted by rising power in their relations with neighboring states, a more process-oriented approach is required. It is a dynamic interaction and ongoing relationship, less of a static situation or simply a policy instrument.
The process-approach is important "because it is only through the interaction of state agents that the structure of the international system is produced, reproduced and sometimes transformed" Wendt , It helps us to better understand how interests, relations, and reasons for the decision of actors for different situations "change over time and given the right conditions, which depends in large part on both the context and nature of their interaction" Ba , The "leadership as process" framework used here consists of three dimensions: context that focus on changing of distribution of relative power resources in existing order, interactions within the leadership project that regulate interstate relations between "would-be-leader" and its potential follower, and outcomes in terms of examination of followership.
In the process approach, a good performance in terms of capabilities can be identified as necessary, but not sufficient condition to gain and sustain leadership in the international politics. The process of becoming a leader, which can be emerged either by introducing the new initiatives and mobilizing another for a common purpose or "from competition among potential leaders to appeal to win follower" Park , 93; Burns , 18 , is determined by relations in motion; it is the transitional phenomenon which is full of dynamics, rather than an entity.
I trace the way in which emerging powers attempt to seek leadership in four phases see Figure 1 :. In Europe, Italy leads in negative views 31 percent, down from 32 percent in , followed by Germany 34 percent, up from 28 percent. Greece, one of the four case studies here and the only one surveyed by Pew in , has a 50 percent favorable opinion of China. Generally, European public opinions are either slightly positive or negative.
Within Southern and Eastern European countries, public opinion, lack of interest, apathy, and pragmatism exemplified by a sense that no one else came to their rescue during the euro crisis dominate. Independent media reporting, academic work, and coverage on China are sparse. Even research on bilateral relations between China and each individual country is often limited due to a lack of resources or motivation. Portugal, a European country with a long-standing relationship with China due to its own colonial history, notably in Asia, became a key partner of Beijing in Western Europe in after signing a strategic partnership exactly five years after the handover of its tiny colony of Macau to China.
Each year, the Sino-Portuguese Macau Forum takes place in the former colony, sometimes in the presence of the Portuguese prime minister and a Chinese vice premier. The Macau connection has played a crucial role in the continuation of the Sino-Portuguese relationship, primarily through a group of influential politicians and advisers once posted in that former colony.
Some of these advisers were instrumental in bringing in the first wave of Chinese investors in the s, mainly in real estate through the empire of Stanley Ho, the Portuguese-speaking casino magnate. As of January , about 3, Chinese nationals had benefited from the scheme—constituting 60 percent of total golden visas, according to the Immigration and Borders Service. Relations between China and Portugal took a fresh step when then president Hu Jintao visited Lisbon in Current Premier Li Keqiang also visited in in addition to a stopover in the Azores, raising concerns in Washington and Brussels about possible investment plans for a maritime research and commercial center on the island of Terceira, next to the U.
Above all, Portugal has become an important recipient of Chinese investment in Europe; per capita, it is one of the largest. According to Portuguese executives, China was the only country willing to step in at the height of the financial crisis in , when the Lisbon government was under pressure from the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund the so-called troika to sell state assets.
At the time, CTG was a relatively minor Chinese state-owned corporation responsible for the construction of the controversial Three Gorges dam in China. It has subsidiaries in the field of renewable energy wind farms, hydro plants in Spain and the United States; it is now the fourth-largest wind operator in the world.
As a major player in the U.
In , CTG raised its stake to In other words, Lisbon wanted to show that it welcomed Chinese investment as discussions between the two countries were being finalized on the southern deepwater port of Sines. Fosun made the best offer over that of Apollo, a U.
Taken together, these acquisitions are strategic assets with strong potential to play an influential role in Portuguese society. More generally, Chinese investors have acquired significant real estate and commercial land, and Portugal is becoming a top destination for Chinese tourists. The Portuguese people have indeed inherited the glorious history of a former superpower that comes with the long-term relationship with China established from the Ming dynasty onward. Others insist on Portugal as belonging to the West for a long time to come. Generally, the Portuguese elites are adamant about their lack of options.
Those who are now criticizing us? Some have taken a divergent opinion. Portugal has become a Chinese aircraft carrier into Europe. For the past three years, the public discourse has become increasingly favorable to Chinese investment and the BRI, with the government openly intending to offer Lisbon as one of the top destinations for them. Consequently, there are few dissenting views.
The construction of a China-sponsored Culture Center in Lisbon is expected to be completed soon. How does all this activity translate to the Portuguese population? Our survey shows mixed results. Regarding other perceptions of China, 62 percent of the respondents perceived it favorably, but 54 percent wanted more discussion about China in Portuguese society, with nearly 43 percent saying that much more discussion would be good.